




POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FINANCE MOTIVES FOR TARIFFS













Governments face many constraints when making taxation decisions, including revenue 
needs, political objectives, and administrative capacities.  Tariffs have an appealing combination 
of features for politicians:  they provide a stream of revenue that is easy to collect, as well as 
satisfying  political  objectives  in  import-competing  industries.    This  paper  describes  the  tax 
structure  governments  choose  when  they  are  not  purely  benevolent.    In  the  model  the 
government  must  finance  a  stream  of  public  expenditures  while  simultaneously  seeking 
campaign  contributions  to  maximize  political  support.    The  predictions  of  the  model  are 
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“Whereas it is necessary for the support of government, for the discharge of the debts of the 
United States, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid on 
goods, wares, and merchandise imported,” From the United States Tariff Act, passed July 4, 
1789 (italics added). 
 
1.  Introduction 
The persistence and prevalence of tariffs, and other trade barriers, across countries and 
times, stands in stark contrast to basic economic intuition.  This intuition has its roots in Adam 
Smith’s “Invisible Hand Theorem” and principle of absolute advantage, and David Ricardo’s law 
of comparative advantage.  The modern world has no shortage of tariffs.  They are used in both 
developing  and  industrialized  nations,  though  much  more  so  in  the  former.    Governments’ 
revealed preference for tariffs and various non-tariff barriers (NTBs) has forced researchers to 
reexamine potential motivations for intervening in trade, to understand both why trade barriers 
are so common, and why they are less so in the developed world.   
The view of taxation presented here is captured in the words of two IMF researchers 
(Tanzi and Zee, 2000), “tax policy is often the art of the possible rather than the pursuit of the 
optimal.”  To this end, I propose a model in which a political support-maximizing government 
must finance a stream of government expenditures given its own limited administrative capacity.  
With two tax instruments available, tariffs and income taxes, the model predicts that both the 
tariff rate,  and the proportion of government revenue coming from trade taxes, decline with 
income.    Furthermore,  the  model  predicts  that  the  usefulness  of  tariffs  does  not  completely 
disappear in rich countries—they continue to be an important source of political support, while 
contributing  minimally  to  the  government’s  revenues.    Thus  the  model  provides  a  single 
framework  which  explains  the  heavy  use  of  tariffs  in  developing  nations,  gradual  trade   2 
liberalization as those countries become richer, and the persistence of trade barriers in wealthy 
nations. 
The  motivations  for  tariffs  that  economists  have  suggested  fall  into  two  general 
categories, both clearly articulated by the text of the Tariff Act of 1789, the first law passed by 
the newly created American Congress. 
The  first  motivation  explored  by  researchers,  and  suggested  by  America’s  earliest 
legislators, is the revenue generated by tariffs.  At its inception, tariffs were the dominant source 
of financing for the U.S. federal government, and today trade taxes are a substantial source of 
government revenue in poor countries, as noted by Burgess and Stern (1993), and Rodrik (1996).  
The second motivation for tariffs proposed by researchers, and hinted at by the first Congress, is 
to gain political backing from those industries shielded from foreign competition, in other words 
“the encouragement and protection of manufactures.”  There is considerable empirical evidence 
that  trade  barriers  are  used  to  curry  favor  from  narrow  constituencies  in  import-competing 
industries.    In  their  study  of  congressional  lobbying  Baldwin  and  Magee  (2000)  find  that 
“campaign contributions…played a role in shaping congressional voting on trade bills in the 
1990s.”    Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) find that large 
politically organized industries benefit from more favorable trade policy in the United States.  
Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) find that the same favoritism prevails in Turkey.  The 
common finding in this literature is that trade policies are systematically biased in favor of vocal 
industries that wield political influence through campaign contributions and reliable voting blocs. 
Like  the  empirical  researchers  discussed  above,  economic  theorists  have  constructed 
models of trade policy determination in an attempt to understand the incidence of tariffs.  Once 
again,  this  research  has  followed  two  distinct  tracks.    The  “political  support”  approach  to   3 
understanding  trade  barriers  originated  in  Hillman  (1982).    This  approach  rationalizes  trade 
barriers as helping incumbent politicians generate support from groups with narrow economic 
interests.  Hillman’s theory finds its intellectual descendant in Grossman and Helpman (1994).  
Their  model  improves  on  Hillman’s  by  supplying  microfoundations  for  political  support:  
politicians  either  make  voters  better  off  directly  by  increasing  their  economic  wellbeing,  or 
expend  campaign  contributions,  acquired  through  a  quid  pro  quo  with  interest  groups,  to 
encourage votes through less socially beneficial channels.  Grossman and Helpman’s theoretical 
results  are  intuitive:    organized  interests  use  tariffs  to  benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of 
unorganized groups. 
  The crucial result from the public finance approach to tariffs, noted by Corden (1974, 
1984), is that tariffs are efficiency-dominated by other revenue raising instruments, and will thus 
be absent from any optimal taxation scheme, unless they have a collection cost advantage over 
taxes with smaller deadweight losses.  Despite this insight, there has been surprisingly little 
theoretical  work  connecting  administrative  costs  to  the  use  of  tariffs.    Aizenman  (1987) 
formalizes  Corden’s  idea  by  showing  that  tariffs  will  be  used  to  raise  some  revenue  if 
consumption taxes entail positive collection costs.  Gardner and Kimbrough (1992) demonstrate 
that the evolution of taxation in the United States can be explained by a shift from tariffs to more 
efficient  tax  regimes  as  revenue  requirements  increase,  making  it  worthwhile  to  adopt  tax 
instruments with greater collection costs.  Burgess and Stern (1993) note that, “different taxes 
make very different demands on administrative capacity”; thus the attractiveness of tariffs for 
some nations can be understood as a consequence of their “administrative feasibility.” 
Existing theoretical work on tariff determination suffers from two limitations.  First, work 
following the political economy track has been virtually obsessed with explaining the variation   4 
in protection across industries, ignoring the variation in tariffs across countries.  Second, the two 
methods  of  explaining  tariffs,  political  support  and  public  finance,  have  remained  largely 
disconnected  in  the  theoretical  literature.
1    Moutos  (2001)  explicitly  argues  that  these  are 
alternative approaches.  On the contrary, I believe these dual explanations are complementary.  
The first American Congress was clearly cognizant of both benefits of import duties, and there is 
ample empirical evidence that both are important today.  In fact, it is the finding of this paper 
that it is not possible to account  for the behavior of tariffs, over time and across countries, 
without considering both motivations.  Incorporating both the political and revenue functions 
into a theory of tariffs will help provide a better understanding of when and why governments 
use trade taxes, especially along the development path. 
The structure of tax regimes varies greatly with the degree of economic development.  It 
is well known that average tariff rates (measured by import duties as a percentage of the value of 
imports), and trade taxes (measured as a percentage of government revenue) are higher in poor 
countries (for an extensive survey, see Burgess and Stern, 1993).  Figures 1 and 2 show scatter 
plots of tariff rates and import duties vs. GDP per capita, respectively.
2  Regression estimates 
establish a significant negative relationship between the variables.  Significant higher order terms 
also  provide  evidence  that  the  relationship  between  the  variables  is  not  entirely  linear  in 
character, but moderately curved.  In other words, tariff rates, and the proportion of taxes coming 
from imports, decline slowly with respect to the level of national income.  Regression coefficient 
                                                 
1 Two exceptions are Cassing and Hillman (1985) and Mayer (2002).  In a median voter model, Mayer assumes that 
tariffs and income taxes have symmetric collection costs.  While this allows the author to explain the popularity of 
tariffs over production subsidies, it is inconsistent with the observation that tariffs are less common in rich countries 
than poor ones.  The approach of Cassing and Hillman looks somewhat archaic compared to current models of 
endogenous trade policy.  Their model, which addresses the government’s choice between tariffs and quotas, is 
partial equilibrium and features a reduced form objective function for the government. 
2 All data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2002, 2003), though the data on tariff rates 
were originally compiled by Rose (2002).  The panel includes 136 countries of varying income levels, from 1970 to 
2002.   5 
estimates for both variables are found in the table below, and the regression curves can be seen in 
their respective figures. 
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Figure 2 
 
Taxes that are more popular in industrialized countries fall into two major categories:  
consumption taxes and income taxes.  These tax instruments produce the great majority of tax 
revenues in rich countries.  The importance of income taxes in particular, relative to trade taxes, 
is also related to the level of economic development.  Figures 3 and 4 show scatter plots of 
income  tax  revenues
3  and  the  sum  of  income  and  excise  tax  revenues  vs.  GDP  per  capita, 
respectively.    Regression  estimates  reveal  that  revenues  from  these  types  of  taxes  are 
significantly, and positively, related to income.  See the table below for coefficient estimates, and 
the respective figures for regression lines. 
                                                 
3 According to the World Bank’s definition, income taxes include taxes on labor income, profits, and capital gains.   7 
Table 2 – Income and Consumption Taxes 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Constant  GDP 

















   8 
Figure 4 
 
There is no systematic relationship between development and the use of consumption and 
excise  taxes.    Tariffs  are  used  more  in  poor  countries,  income  taxes  are  used  more  in  rich 
countries,  and  consumption  taxes  are  used  in  roughly  the  same  proportion  in  rich  and  poor 
countries.    Consumption  taxes  are  more  difficult  to  collect  than  tariffs,  and  can  be  less 
distortionary.  The bulk of tax revenue in industrialized countries is composed of both income 
and consumption taxes. 
Empirical evidence suggesting that political forces are important in the shaping trade 
policy is widespread.  Gawande and Prishna (2003) provide an excellent survey, and conclude 
that  “[r]esearchers,  combining  a  variety  of  data  sources  and  methods,  have  provided  a   9 
convincing confirmation of the presence and significance of political-economic influences” in 
the determination of trade policy.  Reconciling, within a single model, the compelling evidence 
that both economic development and political influence are major determinants of trade policy is 
the aim of this chapter. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the political economy 
model of tax regimes.  Section 3 discusses the numerical results of the model from Section 2.  
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Model 
2.1 Structure 
The present model adapts the microfoundations for political influence of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) for a model of taxation with collection costs.  Similar analytical approaches, 
focusing on the administrative costs of income and consumption taxes, which have more of an 
optimal taxation flavor (because they assume a benevolent government) are Aizenman (1987) 
and Gardner and Kimbrough (1992).
4   
The crucial actor here is the government, which maximizes a political support function 
that  takes  the  utility  of  the  representative  agent,  U ,  and  campaign  contributions,  C ,  as  its 
arguments: 
  ( ) C U P ,   (1) 
                                                 
4 The primary difference between the current approach and earlier models of collection cost motives for tariffs, aside 
from the addition of purely political motives, is the way in which the collection costs are modeled.  Collection costs 
associated with advanced tax regimes implicitly grow with the scale of the economy in Aizenman (1987) and 
Gardner and Kimbrough (1992), though the scale of the economy is not a variable of interest the Aizenman model.  
Here the collection costs associated with the income tax depend on the tax rate, but not on the scale of the economy, 
so their size declines in relative terms as the economy grows.  See below for a more complete explanation of the 
approach.   10 
This objective function is a product of the politician’s electoral incentives, which depend 
on the fact that some voters are informed and others are uninformed.  Informed voters are only 
swayed  by  tangible  performance,  which  they  measure  by  their  own  utility.    Uninformed  or 
indifferent voters, on the other hand, are influenced by political advertising and encouraged to go 
to the polls through the expenditure of campaign contributions.  This objective function captures 
a politician’s ability to influence both kinds of voters.  Denzau and Munger (1986) discuss how 
the political process could give rise to this sort of objective function. 
The government must also finance public expenditures, G , at every point in time.  There 
are two types of taxes available, tariffs, levied at rate τ , and income taxes, levied at rate t.  G  
represents government spending on national defense and other market creating institutions that 
do not contribute directly to utility.
5 
The  two  tax  instruments  are  contrasted  in  the  following  ways:    tariffs  are  (a)  very 
detrimental to welfare because they are highly distorting, and (b) cheap to collect (Burgess and 
Stern, 1993), while income taxes are (a) by assumption non-distorting (the factors of production 
are endowments which are supplied inelastically), and (b) require an expensive infrastructure to 
collect.  This simple dichotomy captures key features of real-world tax regimes, and will drive 
the results of the model.  Here, the non-distorting income tax serves as a proxy for a set of tax 
instruments (labor income, corporate income, capital gains, value-added taxes, sales taxes, etc.) 
that are more efficient, and more costly to collect, than trade taxes. 
The assumption that income taxes are non-distorting is perhaps more innocuous than it 
seems.  In a production economy, the income tax reduces the rate of return to the factors of 
production, and also their use if they have an opportunity cost (say, leisure).  However, tariffs 
                                                 
5 It is straightforward to make G endogenous if it contributes to utility.  This possibility is discussed Section 4.   11 
introduce a similar distortion by raising the overall price of consumption.   If the factors of 
production are supplied inelastically, tariffs distort the relative price of consumption, and income 
taxes create no distortion.  On the other hand, with endogenous income, tariffs distort the relative 
price of consumption and reduce the return to production, while income taxes only reduce the 
return  to  production.    Because  increases  in  the  income  tax  rate  and  the  tariff  rate  have  a 
symmetric effect on the return to production, the additional distortion does not make either tax 
instrument more attractive.
6 
The government’s budget constraint is  
  ( ) tI M t f G + = + τ   (2) 
where  ( ) t f  is the administrative cost associated with income tax rate  t,  I  is national income, 
and M  is the value of imports.  G  is a constant fraction of income such that  I G γ = .   
Administrative costs are modeled as a function of the tax rate.  Higher tax rates are 
associated  with  higher  enforcement  costs  because  (a)  they  expand  the  proportion  of  the 
population that it is profitable to levy taxes on, and (b) higher tax rates increase incentives for tax 
evasion  (Clotfelter,  1983).    For  very  low  tax  rates,  it  only  makes  sense  to  pursue  wealthy 
individuals and the largest corporations—the number of individuals taxed is relatively small, as 
is the cost of collection.  Higher tax rates expand the number of individuals and businesses that 
would  contribute  a  meaningful  amount  to  tax  receipts,  hence  increasing  enforcement  and 
bureaucratic costs.  Increased tax evasion at higher tax rates also increases enforcement costs.  
This implies that  ( ) 0 > ′ t f .
7 
                                                 
6 Unreported simulations confirm that introducing this additional distortion has a negligible impact on the economy. 
7 As long as collecting income taxes entails some variable costs, in addition to any fixed administrative costs, the 
total cost of tax collection will be increasing in the tax rate for any non-uniform distribution of income.   12 
It  may  seem  intuitive  to  model  collection  costs  as  proportional  to  total  income  tax 
revenues.  Unfortunately, this would be inconsistent with a number of empirical realities.  First, 
the collection costs associated with income taxation are known to be more burdensome for poor 
countries (e.g. Burgess and Stern, 1993, Kenny and Toma, 1997, Kubota, 2000, Yeşin, 2004), so 
even if collection costs are an increasing function of revenue, they must grow more slowly than 
the tax base.  Second, cross-sectional data indicate that collection costs per capita can be lower 
for rich countries, despite dramatically higher revenues.
8,9 
There is an import-competing sector of the economy that would benefit from tariffs.  
Independent of the specification of this sector, there will be some willingness to pay for tariffs.  
This  willingness  to  pay  can  be  thought  of  as  a  “demand  for  protection”  (or  equivalently,  a 
“supply of campaign contributions”) and characterized as a function 
  ( ) τ C C =   (3) 
where  C  is the amount of campaign contributions the firm is willing to pay for tariff level τ , 
such that  ( ) 0 > ′ τ C .
10  In other words, the contribution schedule is an increasing function of the 
degree of protection afforded, whether this protection is created by tariffs or other types of trade 
barriers.    This  technique  of  quantifying  political  support  was  popularized  by  Grossman  and 
Helpman (1994).   
                                                 
8 Some examples of collection costs per capita:  Japan (2001) $45.67, Turkey (1996) $54.04, USA (1997) $25.93, 
Australia (1999-2000) $154.  Sources:  CIA World Factbook, Department of Finance and Administration of 
Australia, Ministry of Finance of Turkey, United States Internal Revenue Service, National Tax Agency of Japan.  
Calculations are the author’s. 
9 Analytically speaking, if collection costs also depend on income or revenue, the elasticity of collection costs must 
be less than one to be consistent with the anecdotal evidence that these costs are more burdensome for poor 
countries. 
10 By assuming the firm donates its entire willingness to pay, the calibrated model will understate the importance of 
political motives in the government’s objective function because it overstates the level of campaign contributions 
received by the government.  Given that it is the ultimate finding of this paper that political motives are necessary to 
explain the government’s choice of tariffs, this understatement actually strengthens the conclusion.   13 
The  import-competing  firm  lobbies  the  government  for  protection,  and  makes  its 
contribution  schedule  known.    The  government  views  the  contribution  schedule  as  a  set  of 
contingencies that will occur based on its choice of the tariff rate, and chooses the tariff rate to 
maximize its political support given the contribution schedule.
11 
So the government’s objective becomes 
  ( ) [ ] τ C U P ,   (4) 
Within the two sector economy, there is a representative consumer that takes τ , t,  x p , 
and  y p  as given
12, owns the economy’s factors of production and maximizes 
  ( ) Y X U ,   (5) 
The solution to the consumer’s maximization problem provides an indirect utility function  
  ( ) t U , τ   (6) 
And an import function 
  ( ) t M , τ   (7) 
Equations (6) and (4) imply that the government’s problem becomes maximizing 
( ) ( ) [ ] τ τ C t U P , ,   (8) 
choosing { } t , τ , subject to 
( ) ( ) tI t M t f I + = + , τ τ γ   (9) 
This is the basic structure of the model. 
                                                 
11 This timing assumption, while common, is problematic in the sense that it is time inconsistent.  Fortunately, the 
framework can be rationalized in the context of a repeated game.  In the most reasonable setting the interaction of 
the government and lobbyists is modeled as a repeated game with uncertain duration, where the chance of the 
politician remaining in power depends on the level of political support.  See Hoffman (2005) for more details. 
12 For the latter variables, this is, equivalently, the assumption that the economy is small.  The model, therefore, 
abstracts from the government’s incentive to improve the terms of trade through the use of an optimum tariff.  This 
implies that the model is not perfectly applicable to the small subset of the largest nations and trading blocs for 
whom the optimum tariff is a reasonable target.   14 
2.2 Specification 
In this section I adopt a specification for the model that is analytically appealing, and 
amenable to a numerical solution. 
The government’s objective function is Cobb-Douglas: 
( )
β β − =
1 , C U C U P   (10)   
  The  lower  β   is,  the  more  useful  campaign  contributions  are  in  satisfying  political 
objectives.  Higher  β  corresponds to a more benevolent government, and  1 = β  is the standard 
utility-maximizing government. 
The  production  side  of  the  economy  is  a  two-sector  specific  factors  model.
13    The 
consumer has endowments of labor,  L , which is mobile between sectors, capital specific to the 
X  sector (which is by assumption the import-competing sector),  x K , and capital specific to the 
Y sector (by elimination the export sector),  y K .  The production functions are given by 
η η − =
1
x x L AK x   (11) 
η η − =
1
y y L BK y   (12) 
The  import-competing  and  export  firms  maximize  the  following  profit  functions, 
respectively 
( ) x x x x x x x wL K r L AK p − − + = Π
−η η τ
1 1   (13) 
y y y y y y y wL K r L BK p − − = Π
−η η 1   (14) 
                                                 
13 The specific-factors model is the preferred framework for lobbying models of trade policy based on the 
observation, by Magee (1982), among others, that almost all lobbying is sector-specific in character (rather than 
factor-specific, as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem).   15 
where  x r  is the rental rate on capital in the  X  sector,  y r  is the rental rate on capital in the Y  
sector, and w is the wage paid to labor. 
Constant returns to scale technology implies that firms producing  x and  y  earn zero 
profits, regardless of prices, and thus have no incentive to lobby for changes in those prices.  
Lobbies in this model are associated with the sector-specific capital stocks.  There are potentially 
countervailing forces between the owners of the capital stock in the import-competing sector and 
owners of the export capital stock (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982).  However, I assume that only the 
pressure group associated with the import-competing capital is politically organized. 
This is not a trivial assumption, and merits some discussion.  It is related to an empirical 
puzzle, noted by Rodrik (1996), “there is no country that I am aware of where the net effect of 
commercial policies is to expand rather than contract trade.”  This is a puzzle because export 
sectors are almost universally larger than import-competing sectors.  Rodrik again, 
if  comparative  advantage  carries  any  force,  countries  will  tend  to  specialize  in  their 
export sectors; that is, they will have larger export sectors than import-competing sectors.  
The  unfortunate  implication  of  this  is  that  we  should  observe  a  bias  toward  export 
subsidies, and not import tariffs!  Indeed, Levy [1999] has shown that in a symmetric 
Grossman-Helpman world the effect of lobbying is to encourage net trade promotion.  
Hence, the Grossman-Helpman framework not only does not help out with the puzzle, it 
actually makes it worse. 
 
Mayer  (2002)  is  one  attempt  to  solve  this  puzzle.    Import-competing  sectors  beat 
exporters in the game of political influence because (a) tax collection is costly, and (b) export 
subsidies require additional revenue while tariffs generate revenue.  So tariffs are the preferable 
political  tool  because  of  their  revenue  consequences,  and  the  import-competing  sector  out-
lobbies the exporters.   16 
The puzzle may have a simpler solution.  As Rodrik notes, export sectors are generally 
larger than import-competing sector.  Olson’s (1965) seminal work establishes that the free-rider 
problem is more challenging the more members in a group.  Export sectors will have more 
difficulty overcoming the problem of collective action if firms in the import-competing  and 
export sectors are of similar size, implying a greater number of firms in the export sector.  If 
import-competing  sectors  find  it  easier  to  organize  and  become  politically  active,  it  is 
unsurprising that they always win the influence game.  Given these empirical and theoretical 
observations, it seems quite natural to assume that the export sector is unorganized, and therefore 
does not counter-lobby. 
The returns to capital in the import-competing sector, and export sector, respectively, are 
C r K x x x − = π   (15) 
y y y r K = π   (16) 
where  C  is campaign contributions to the government, given in exchange for protection in the 
form of tariffs. 
  The first order conditions of the firms imply that 
( ) x x x x r L AK p = +
− − η η η τ
1 1 1   (17) 
y y y y r L BK p =
− − η η η
1 1   (18) 
( ) ( ) ( )
η η η η η η τ
− − − = = − + y y y x x x L BK p w L AK p 1 1 1   (19) 
Market clearing implies 
x x K K =   (20) 
y y K K =   (21)   17 
L L L y x = +   (22) 
From equations (19)-(22), equilibrium labor supply is 
( ) ( )
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Campaign  contributions  are  the  willingness  to  pay  for  tariffs;  therefore,  based  on 
equations (15), (17), and (23) 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )















































1 0 L K A p r r K C x x x x x  
(25) 
Combining (25) and (10) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



















































1 , L K A p U C U P x x (26) 
Returning to the consumption side of the economy, the consumer also maximizes a Cobb-
Douglas utility function 
( )
α α − =
1 , Y X Y X U   (27) 
subject to 
( ) ( )I t X p Y p x y − = + + 1 1 τ   (28)   18 
The  consumer’s  income  is  composed  of  labor  income,  and  capital  income  from  the 
import-competing sector (less campaign contributions) and the export sector 
( ) w L r K C r K I y y x x + + − = τ   (29) 
The familiar equilibrium values result from the consumer’s maximization problem 
( )
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y x p p
I t
U   (32) 
where  I  is given by equation (29) with the factor payments evaluated at their equilibrium values 
[they are omitted for space, but can be readily derived from equations (17)-(24)]. 
Equation (30) implies that imports in equilibrium are given by 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )






































p x X p M x
x
x x   (33) 
Equation (22) implies that the government’s political support function is 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )















































































Equation (33) implies the government’s budget constraint is 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
tI L K A
p
I t







































  (35) 
The government maximizes (34) choosing { } t , τ , subject to (35).   19 
3. Results 
3.1 Equilibrium 
There are no closed-form solutions for t and τ .  By (a) selecting values for parameters, 
and (b) specifying an administrative cost function, the model can be solved numerically. 
It will be useful to introduce a parameter, say ∆, that determines the size of the economy 
(and therefore the level of economic development), such that  0 A A ∆ =  and  0 B B ∆ = .  So growth 
is driven by exogenous technological progress, and the parameter  ∆ can be used to perform 
comparative statics by exogenously changing the level of national income. 
Finally, let  ( )
2 st t f =  (it must be the case that  ( ) 0 > ′ ′ t f  to satisfy  the second order 
conditions, and this will be true when the income distribution is sufficiently skewed). 
The quantities of interest are tariff and income tax revenues, and how they respond to the 
level of national income, the benevolence (or selfishness) of the government, and the costliness 
of the income tax infrastructure. 
I see the model as having two “switches” than can be turned on and off separately or 
together.  The first is the government’s desire for campaign contributions–turning it off reduces 
the model to the typical benevolent government, that must generate revenue given that income 
taxes have administrative costs, while maximizing the utility of the representative agent.  The 
second  “switch”  is  the  collection  costs  associated  with  income  taxes–turning  it  off  leaves 
political support as the primary incentive for imposing tariffs.  Turning both “switches” off leads 
to a trivial model, in which tariffs will be left out of the optimal taxation scheme.  Turning these 
“switches” on and off will help to illustrate which assumptions of the model are responsible for 
which predictions.  These “switches” are embodied in the parameters β  and s.   20 
Figure 5 
 
The  graph  above  demonstrates  what  happens  to  tariff  rates  as  national  income  rises 
(income varies based on the choice of the parameter∆).  Tariff rates fall as the nation becomes 
richer because the administrative cost of the income tax regime eventually becomes a negligible 
proportion of GDP,
14 and therefore tariffs have no collection cost advantage relative to income 
taxes.  Administrative costs necessarily become insignificant as a percentage of GDP as GDP 
rises, at least in the limit.  This is because there is an implicit upper bound on the income tax 
rate,  1 = t ,  and  therefore  an  upper  bound  on  administrative  costs  ( ) t f .    Therefore 
                                                 
14 It is also possible that development, in and of itself, may lower administrative costs.  The physical and 
telecommunications infrastructure that accompanies development makes tax collection less costly.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the model, whose results rest on the fact that the administrative costs of tax 






15    In  words,  the  appeal  of  tariffs  as  a  tool  of  public  finance  disappears 
asymptotically. 
An increase in  β  reduces the marginal benefit of campaign contributions, and therefore 
also reduces tariffs.  In fact,  1 = β  corresponds to a benevolent government, thus the usefulness 
of tariffs declines very rapidly with income. 
It is interesting to note that if  1 < β , the tariff rate converges to a nonzero level, no matter 
how  rich  the  economy  grows.    The  government’s  purely  political  incentives  give  the  tariff 
permanence in the economy despite its sub-optimality as a tool for collecting revenue in richer 
countries.  Contrast this result with Gardner and Kimbrough (1992), in which the government 
completely abandons tariffs upon switching to an income tax regime.  This effect is quite novel, 
and would not occur if tariffs did not generate political support in addition to revenue. 
The  parameter  β   can  be  thought  of  as  representing  deeper  features  of  the  political 
process  and  institutional  framework  in  a  given  country  (see  Rodrik,  2002,  and  Acemoglu, 








                                                 
15 This result will hold for any administrative cost function that is consistent with the empirical evidence noted in 
section 2.1.   22 
Figure 6 
 
The above graph shows equilibrium tariffs for various values of s, the scale parameter in 
the administrative cost function.  Clearly, an increase in  s makes income tax collection more 
costly, and therefore tariffs relatively more attractive.  This effect is only temporary, however, 
and tariffs converge to the same level, regardless of s. 
  While  the  income  tax  rate  is  relatively  stable  over  the  course  of  development,  the 








Given information on the cost of tax collection and average tax rates, the value of the 
parameter s can be estimated.  Take the United States, for example.  The United States budgeted 
$7 billion for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1997 (Investor’s Business Daily, April 16, 
1997).  The IRS is part of the American Treasury Department, and is charged with collecting 
taxes and enforcing tax laws.  The US population was roughly 270 million in 1997, meaning that 





According to the World Bank, in 1997 taxes collected by the federal government as a percentage 
of  GDP  was  19%.    Therefore,  ( ) 718 93 . 25 19 .
2 2 = ⇒ = ⋅ = = s s st t f .    The  parameter  s   24 
estimates an upper-bound on the per capita cost of tax collection, because  ( ) s f = 1 .  Here, $718 
per  capita  represents  the  hypothetical  cost  of  assessing  all  types  of  income  taxes,  on  all 
individuals, as tax rates approached 100% (one can imagine the degree of tax evasion at such 
rates would be substantial!). 
  One question to pose to the model is the following:  Can public finance motives alone 
explain the cross-sectional properties of tariff rate data?  The question can be approached by 
observing the prediction of the model regarding tariff rates when  718 = s  and  1 = β .  Tariff rates 
fall extremely rapidly if  1 = β , dropping to zero when national income rises above $4000 per 
capita. 
Figure 8 
   25 
Looking again at Figures 1 and 2, this is inconsistent with the data.  Tariff rates, and 
revenues, exhibit a slow, smooth, drop as income rises (recall the discussion in Section 1).  The 
obvious conclusion is that  1 < β .
16  Political motives are necessary to explain the gradual pattern 
of tariff reduction observed across countries.  An alternative interpretation is that any tariffs 
observed in nations with per capita income greater than $4000 cannot be justified on efficiency 
grounds. 
How important are political motives?  In other words, what value of  β  comes closest to 
replicating the pattern of tariff reduction discussed in the introduction?  The value of  β  that 
minimizes the least squared deviation from the model’s predictions, and the regression reported 
in Table 1 is .998 (see Figure 9 below).
17  Bear in mind that this exercise can only suggest the 
relative importance of various factors in influencing the evolution of tariff rates.  One cannot 
expect to actually replicate the cross-sectional properties of tariff rates given that there may be 








                                                 
16 Calibrations based on alternative administrative cost technologies would also produce this result because 
collection costs in the U.S. are too small to merit the use of tariffs on efficiency grounds. 
17 The value of beta does not have a cardinal interpretation so much as an ordinal interpretation.   A country with a 
lower beta has a lower quality of governance than a country with a higher beta, but the absolute level of beta does 
not have convenient interpretation (see footnote 10).  Further, it will be sensitive to the choice of the government’s 




The broad conclusion of the previous section is that both political support and revenue-
raising motives can help explain the incidence of tariffs.  A model with these dual motivations 
has  implications  for  three  additional  policy  variables:  subsidies,  NTBs,  and  the  level  of 
government spending. 
Rodrik (1996) noted that the literature on the political economy of trade policy had not 
adequately explained governments’ revealed preference for tariffs over production subsidies.  In 
an  open  economy,  production  subsidies  entail  a  lower  deadweight  loss  than  trade  barriers 
because they only distort producer decisions, whereas trade barriers distort the decisions of both 
producers  and  consumers.    Therefore  subsidies  to  producers  are  a  more  efficient  means  of   27 
redistribution.  Mayer (2002) offers a compelling explanation for this phenomenon.  Given that 
taxation has collection costs, “a policy instrument that redistributes income and collects revenues 
(tariff)  has  cost  advantages  over  a  policy  instrument  that  redistributes  income  and  spends 
revenues (subsidy).”   
The current model is consistent with Mayer’s result, though only for poor countries.  
Once the administrative costs of the income tax become negligible, the government would prefer 
a production subsidy or lump-sum transfer to the import-competing firm over a tariff.  In other 
words, the government may substitute other redistributive instruments for tariffs once the nation 
is sufficiently rich.  This may help explain why some rich nations collect no trade taxes.   
Ray  and  Marvel  (1984)  note  that  multilateral  trade  liberalization  is  often  offset  by 
increases in NTBs.  This is very much consistent with the current model as well.  Once revenue 
motives for tariffs disappear, at high income levels, a political support maximizing government 
will begin to find NTBs more appealing, even though they generate no revenue (VERs, for 
example,  or  obviously  protectionist  “quality  standards”  or  “safety  regulations”).    Yu  (2000) 
provides a suggestion that might hasten the transition to NTBs in rich countries, “tariffs are far 
more transparent to the public than NTBs.”  If obfuscation on the part of the government can 
lessen the loss of political support from relatively informed consumers, then a transition from 
tariffs to NTBs in rich countries is unsurprising. 
Finally, a modified version of the current model may shed some light on “Wagner’s 
Law,”  the  often  studied  (e.g.  Ghate  and  Zak,  2002,  or  Kolluri,  Panik,  and  Wahab,  2000) 
empirical finding that public expenditures rise, as a percentage of income, as income rises.  The 
modification is to simply make government purchases endogenous by including them in the 
utility function and allowing the government to choose the level of G  which maximizes political   28 
support (as well as the tariff and income tax rates).  In this model the increase in the size of 
government expenditures, scaled by GDP, is driven by the gradual increase in the efficiency of 
tax collection as the income tax base grows.  Early reliance on tariffs, and their accompanying 
distortions,  will  cause  the  government  to  limit  expenditures  in  order  to  minimize  those 
distortions.  As it becomes optimal to use less distorting taxes, government expenditures rise.  
See  Figure  10  below,  from  an  extended  version  of  the  model  with  endogenous  government 
spending:  government purchases rise and tariffs fall, consistent with data on both variables. 
Figure 10 
 
4.  Conclusion 
  One  of  the  defining  characteristics  of  taxation  in  developing  countries  is  the  heavy 
reliance on tariffs as a source of revenue.  One of the defining characteristics of the political   29 
process, in developing and developed countries, is the misguided mercantilist tone surrounding 
trade  policy  debates,  in  which  foreign  competitors  are  demonized,  and  laws  are  enacted  to 
protect domestic firms.  The conventional wisdom on the sub-optimality of trade interventions, 
under most assumptions, makes this a perplexing state of affairs. 
  Diverging from the optimal taxation approach, I assume that the government maximizes a 
political  support  function,  which  is  a  geometric  weighted  average  of  the  utility  of  the 
representative  consumer,  and  campaign  contributions.    Also  crucial  to  the  model  is  the 
assumption that income taxes entail collection costs that are an increasing function of the tax 
rate, but not directly proportional to revenue.  With these assumptions the model brings together 
two largely distinct theoretical approaches:  research that explains tariffs as a tool of public 
finance,  and  research  that  explains  tariffs  as  a  tool  to  redistribute  resources  to  politically 
important sectors of the economy. 
  The model’s predictions capture several key features of the data.  First, that tariff rates 
are higher in poor countries.  Second, that income tax revenue, as a share of total government 
revenue, rises with GDP.  Third, that average tariff rates decline gradually as GDP rises.  Fourth, 
that government expenditures rise, as a percentage of income, as income rises.  Fifth, and finally, 
that trade barriers remain common in rich countries, despite their minimal contribution to tax 
revenue. 
Based on this model, an observer of international economic policy should view moderate 
poor country tariffs as a necessary method of financing useful government expenditures, and yet 
reserve a severe skepticism for trade barriers in richer countries.  Advocating trade liberalization 
in extremely poor countries is problematic; the administrative costs of alternative tax regimes are 
potentially crippling to a fledgling government.  Development lending would pay substantial   30 
dividends if directed toward enhancing the administrative capacity of poor country governments, 
making the transition to a more advanced tax regime less difficult.  Furthermore, unilateral trade 
liberalization by industrialized countries would bring about eventual reciprocal liberalization by 
developing  countries,  not  through  political  channels,  but  as  trade  with  the  developed  world 
increased incomes, tariffs would almost certainly fall.  Another message of the model is that, 
contrary  to  the  public  finance  approach,  one  should  not  view  all  observed  trade  barriers  as 
economically efficient.  There may be a role for international institutions, including the World 
Bank  and  the  WTO,  as  well  as  domestic  institutions,  in  reducing  the  weight  of  campaign 
contributions in the politician’s objective function, and hence reducing tariffs.  For this reason 
“institution building” continues to be an important target for development lending. 
Turning to future research, an additional feature of this model may yield insight into 
poverty traps.  If both administrative costs and the proportion of income devoted to government 
purchases are high enough, the economy lacks an equilibrium.  In fact, the administrative costs 
of income taxation may make it impossible to finance basic government operations.  This is a 
troubling prospect for developing nations!  Assuming there is a connection between public good 
provision  and  economic  growth,  an  extension  of  the  current  model  could  determine  the 
conditions  under  which  high  tax  collection  costs  might  result  in  a  poverty  trap  because  the 
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